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IMPEACHMENT: THE DILEMMA OF THE
DEFENDANT-WITNESS IN NORTH CAROLINA
THOMAS C. MANNING*
A defense attorney whose client has a criminal record or a questiona-
ble personal background encounters the difficult decision whether to
allow the client to testify at trial. When presented with impeachment
evidence of prior convictions or bad acts, a jury may conclude, because
the defendant was previously convicted, he is more than likely guilty of
the offense with which he is presently charged. If the defendant's past
is sordid, the jury may decide the defendant probably deserves to be
convicted whether or not he committed the present offense.I In North
Carolina, this problem is further complicated by the possibility of im-
peachment with information concerning crimes with which the defend-
ant was charged but not convicted.2 A danger is thus created: the
defendant may be convicted on the basis of inferences drawn not only
from prior convictions, but also from information concerning alleged
crimes of which the defendant has been acquitted or otherwise exoner-
ated. This jeopardizes not only the presumption of innocence, but also
the Anglo-Saxon preference for trying only those matters that are the
subject of the case at bar.
Of course, a defendant need not testify. If he does not testify, he
cannot be impeached. However, jurors may infer guilt from silence,
reasoning that if a defendant is truly innocent, he should be willing to
testify. The average juror may be convinced that a defendant would
not be on trial if he had not done something wrong. A survey con-
ducted by the Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems revealed
that eighty-eight percent of attorneys and eighty-nine percent of the
* Partner, Cheshire, Manning & Parker, Raleigh, N.C. B.A., University of North Carolina,
1974; J.D., University of South Carolina Law Center, 1977; Senior Law Clerk, Chief United States
District Judge, E.D.N.C., 1977-78; Assistant United States Attorney, E.D.N.C., 1978-80; United
States Commissioner, 1980.
This article was developed, in part, from materials originally presented at a seminar entitled
"Evidence-Techniques and Strategies for the Civil and Criminal Trial Lawyer," sponsored by
the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers on March 6, 1981 in Greensboro, N.C. The author
and the editors of the North Carolina Central Law Journal are grateful to the Academy for their
permission to use those materials in the preparation of this article.
1. Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take the Stand- The Dilemma of a Defendant With a
Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J.L. SOC. PROB. 215 (1968).
2. See State v. Mack, 282 N.C. 334, 193 S.E.2d 71 (1972). See text accompanying notes 55-
60 infra.
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judges polled believed the defendant's chances of acquittal are greater
if he testifies.'
If the defendant testifies and is impeached, the court may instruct the
jury to consider the impeachment evidence not as evidence of guilt or
innocence, but as bearing only on the defendant's credibility. But it is
doubtful whether jurors can distinguish evidence bearing only on the
defendant's veracity. One study polling trial lawyers and judges found
that ninety-eight percent of the lawyers and forty-three percent of the
judges did not believe jurors could make that distinction.4 Perhaps it is
unrealistic to expect jurors to be either willing or able to follow a limit-
ing instruction. As one commentator has stated:
Lawyers are trained for years in the hope that eventually they come to
understand the inconsistency between allowing proof of criminal pro-
pensity through evidence of bad character and trial on the merits. As-
suming such an understanding, it is not clear that even a lawyer can
consider evidence for one purpose and yet exclude it in his considera-
tion of other issues.
5
There is also a probability that a trial court's limiting instruction will
enhance the jury's perception of the damaging material. The defendant
must choose between the subtle inference of his guilt arising from his
decision not to testify or the potential damage of impeachment with
evidence of prior convictions or specific acts of misconduct.
This article will analyze the existing North Carolina law regarding
impeachment of a defendant-witness and suggest practical ways for the
defense to handle the problem through the use of motions in limine.
I. THE NORTH CAROLINA IMPEACHMENT RULE
Ideally, courts should not permit impeachment through cross-exami-
nation of the defendant regarding prior convictions or past misconduct
without considering the prejudicial effect of doing so. To some extent,
Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires federal courts to
make such a determination. Unless the defendant was convicted of a
crime involving dishonesty, cross-examination will only be allowed
with respect to crimes with sentences exceeding one year, and then only
where the court finds that the probative value exceeds the prejudicial
effect. The federal rule places the burden on the court to determine the
prejudicial effect of impeachment evidence before it is presented to the
jury. On the other hand, North Carolina courts do not directly con-
sider the prejudicial effect of impeachment evidence, nor do courts
3. Note, supra note I, at 221-22.
4. Id. at 218.
5. Nichol, Prior Crime Impeachment of Criminal Defendants: A Constitutional Analysis of
Rule 609, 82 W. VA. L.R. 391, 404 (1980).
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limit cross-examination to serious crimes or those bearing on veracity.
In North Carolina a criminal defendant may be cross-examined with
questions pertaining to all kinds of prior conduct, including any prior
convictions.6 In Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp. ,' the North Carolina
Supreme Court outlined the policy behind this all inclusive rule. The
court reasoned that the rule has the advantage of certainty of applica-
tion, that juries may evaluate the evidence properly, and that judges
may restrict the scope of cross-examination within reasonable bounds.8
The burden of balancing the prejudice of character impeachment
against its probative value falls largely upon the jury.
A number of factors offset the harshness of North Carolina's all in-
clusive rule. First, substantive limitations prohibit cross-examination
concerning void convictions, unconstitutionally obtained evidence, and
evidence that the defendant was arrested or indicted for specific con-
duct.9 Second, when cross-examining a defendant about prior convic-
tions or specific acts of misconduct, prosecutors are bound to use good
faith." Third, while North Carolina courts generally permit cross-ex-
amination with respect to specific acts of misconduct which have been
the subject of indictment, arrest, or even acquittal, they have restricted
the manner in which cross-examination may proceed." Questions
phrased in terms of specific acts of misconduct must refer to a particu-
lar act and may not be improperly insinuating. 2 Moreover, it must
appear from the questioning that the conduct was wrongful and not
merely suspect in nature. 3 Fourth, North Carolina follows the rule
that the cross-examiner is bound by a defendant's answer and may not
introduce extrinsic evidence in rebuttal.' Finally, a defendant may re-
quest the judge to give a limiting instruction that the jury consider the
impeachment evidence only as it bears on credibility,' 5 or seek exclu-
6. Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 156 S.E.2d 265 (1967); D. STANSBURY,
NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §§ 111-112 (Brandis rev. 1973).
In State v. Ross the North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
Lack of trustworthiness may be evidenced by a witness's repeated and abiding contempt for
the laws which he is legally and morally bound to obey. The probative evidence of prior
crimes seems all the more relevant in a case of the witness who is also a defendant, for he,
unlike a witness not on trial, has a direct interest in the outcome of the case ...
295 N.C. 488, 493, 246 S.E.2d 780, 784 (1978) (citations omitted). For a discussion of Ross, see
text accompanying notes 20-21 infra.
7. 271 N.C. 276, 156 S.E.2d 265 (1967).
8. Id. at 282, 156 S.E.2d at 270.
9. See text accompanying notes 16-43 infra.
10. D. STANSBURY, supra note 6 §§ 111-112. See text accompanying notes 44-67 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 68-86 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 69-81 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 77-83 infra.
14. State v. Cross, 284 N.C. 174, 200 S.E.2d 27 (1973); Pearce v. Barham, 267 N.C. 707, 149
S.E.2d 22 (1966); D. STANSBURY, supra note 6, § 111.
15. State v. Bowen, 289 N.C. 644, 224 S.E.2d 551 (1976); State v. Williams, 272 N.C. 273, 158
S.E.2d 85 (1967).
3
Manning: Impeachment: The Dilemma of the Defendant-Witness in North Caroli
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1981
38 NORTH CAROLINA CENTR,4L LAW JOURNAL
sion or limitation of such evidence through motions in limine. The dis-
cussion that follows will focus on these areas.
A. Constitutional-Substantive Limitations on Cross-Examination
Regarding Prior Criminal Conduct
The major substantive limitations on the use of prior criminal con-
duct for impeachment purposes have been imposed under various con-
stitutional doctrines set out by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
State v. Williams. "6 The general rule permitting cross-examination of
criminal defendants with respect to past convictions and criminal con-
duct has withstood numerous constitutional challenges. Most fre-
quently, the rule has been upheld under the United States Supreme
Court decision in Spencer v. Texas. 7 Lower courts construing Spencer
have stated that determining the scope and method of character im-
peachment with past convictions is a legislative prerogative. 8 The
Constitution does not require that the courts balance the potential for
prejudice against the probative value of evidence bearing on credibility
in every case. In Mc~autha v. California, '9 the United States Supreme
Court ruled that requiring a defendant to choose between the benefit of
his testimony and the detrimental effects of impeachment with past
convictions and misconduct does not infringe a defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination.
In State v. Ross,20 the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed a
constitutional challenge to the North Carolina impeachment rule. In
Ross, a defendant appealed his conviction for possession with intent to
distribute a controlled substance. He contended that the North Caro-
lina practice of allowing cross-examination concerning unrelated con-
victions and past misconduct violated due process by placing too high a
burden on the defendant's right to testify. Responding to this argument
the court stated: "Sufficient protection from undue prejudice is af-
forded by the court's instructions limiting consideration of the evidence
of prior offenses to the matter of the defendant's credibility as a wit-
ness. Due process does not require more. "21
Cross-examination regarding prior criminal convictions has been
16. 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174 (1971). See text accompanying notes 32-35 infra.
17. 385 U.S. 554 (1967). In Spencer the petitioner contended that a Texas recidivist statute
violated the fourteenth amendment when jurors were informed of a defendant's criminal record
before trial, but instructed to consider it only in determining sentencing. The Supreme Court
found no violation of the fourteenth amendment.
18. E.g., United States v. Belt, 514 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (defendants unsuccessfully chal-
lenged a District of Columbia mandatory impeachment statute).
19. 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (defendants challenged California and Ohio death sentencing
statutes).
20. 295 N.C. 488, 246 S.E.2d 780 (1978).
21. Id. at 493, 246 S.E.2d at 784.
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limited slightly under other constitutional doctrines. The defendant in
Ross also claimed that the trial court erroneously permitted cross-ex-
amination relating to the fruits of an illegal search in a prior drug case.
The prior case had been dismissed because of the unlawful search.
Under the rule of Agnello v. United States,2 2 as refined in Walder v.
United States,23 a defendant may not be impeached with illegally ob-
tained evidence unless he opens the door on direct examination, for
example, by denying possession of narcotics. In Ross the defendant
made no reference to the search in his direct testimony, and he claimed
the cross-examination referring to it constituted error. The court did
not rule on the constitutional merits of defendant's argument, stating
that defendant had failed to activate the rule. In order to activate the
Agnello - Wa/der rule, it must appear from the record that the search
was illegal for constitutional reasons or that a "substantial violation" of
North Carolina General Statutes section 15A-974 has occurred. 24 De-
fendant's testimony in the record to the effect that the district judge had
declared the search unlawful was insufficient to establish constitutional
violations. Since defendant's record failed to detail the nature of the
violation, the court refused to find a substantial violation of section
15A-974.
Constitutionally void convictions may not be used to impeach a
criminal defendant. In State v. A/ford,25 the defendant entered a nego-
tiated plea of guilty to manslaughter in a prosecution for murder. In a
post-conviction hearing, it was found that the defendant had not know-
ingly and understandingly entered the plea. At retrial, the prosecution
cross-examined the defendant concerning his prior guilty plea to man-
slaughter. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the cross-ex-
amination was prejudicial error. The Court stated: "Testimony in a
subsequent trial relating to such void plea was incompetent for any
purpose. 26 Other North Carolina cases have applied the United States
Supreme Court's holdings in Loper v. Beto 2 7 and Gideon v. Wain-
22. 269 U.S. 20 (1925). When federal agents were unable to present evidence of an unlawful
narcotics seizure, they cross-examined defendant concerning his knowledge of the narcotics.
When defendant denied any knowledge, the government introduced rebuttal evidence. The Court
held that unconstitutionally seized evidence may not be used to impeach a defendant's testimony
where he has not testified regarding the evidence during direct examination and denies any
knowledge when cross-examined.
23. 347 U.S. 62 (1954). In Walder's trial, the Supreme Court allowed the use of illegal evi-
dence to impeach defendant's testimony after he opened the door on direct.
24. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-974 (1978). See note 103 infra.
25. 274 N.C. 125, 161 S.E.2d 575 (1975).
26. Id. at 134, 161 S.E.2d at 581.
27. 405 U.S. 473 (1972). Defendant Loper prevailed in a habeas corpus proceeding challeng-
ing his 1947 rape conviction. Because he was not represented by counsel, the Supreme Court's
ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright applied retroactively.
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wright, 8 which prohibit the use of prior convictions to impeach a crim-
inal defendant when the defendant was neither provided with counsel
nor able to afford private counsel at the trial leading to the prior con-
viction. In State v. Atkinson,29 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
held that the defendant has the burden of proof to show his inability to
employ counsel at the time of his previous conviction. Nothing else
appearing from the record, a conviction is presumed valid. But what
evidence must appear from the record? In State v. Vincent,3 ° defendant
was tried for rape and assault. Before the defendant testified, his coun-
sel moved to exclude cross-examination pertaining to defendant's prior
conviction of a crime against nature. Before the trial court ruled on the
motion, the defendant testified that he had not had appointed counsel
and was unable to afford counsel at the prior trial. His motion was
denied. Because the prosecutor presented no evidence to rebut defend-
ant's testimony, the court of appeals held that defendant had met his
burden of proof.3'
In addition to the foregoing constitutional limitations on the im-
peachment rule, North Carolina courts follow the rule that the prosecu-
tion may not impeach a defendant by asking whether he has been
arrested or indicted for prior criminal conduct. By adopting this rule in
State v. Williams,32 North Carolina joined the great majority of states.
In a trial for armed robbery, the district attorney cross-examined the
defendant by asking him if he were under indictment for another
armed robbery elsewhere in the state. On appeal, the North Carolina
Supreme Court took note of the hearsay and accusatory nature of an
indictment. The court held that, for purposes of impeachment, a wit-
ness, including a criminal defendant, cannot be cross-examined regard-
ing prior indictments or arrests for unrelated offenses.3 3 Despite the
importance of this decision, the court limited its effect with dicta that
would become important in later decisions. In short, the court limited
the principle by holding that violation of the rule does not always con-
stitute reversible error. Whether a new trial is necessary depends upon
the facts and circumstances of each case.34 The court further stated
that Williams does not restrict the use of prior bad acts when cross-
28. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
29. 39 N.C. App. 575, 251 S.E.2d 677 (1979). Accord State v. Buckner, 34 N.C. App. 447, 238
S.E.2d 635 (1977).
30. 35 N.C. App. 369, 241 S.E.2d 390 (1978).
31. Id. at 373, 241 S.E.2d at 393. The court found that defendant had met his burden under
Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847 (1971), a Georgia habeas corpus decision in which the Supreme
Court overturned the defendant's conviction for armed robbery on the basis of his testimony that
he had not been able to afford counsel and none had been appointed.
32. 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174 (1971). But see text accompanying notes 41-43 infra.
33. Id. at 672, 185 S.E.2d at 180.
34. Id. at 674-75, 185 S.E.2d at 181.
6
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examining to impeach a defendant witness. However, the conduct in
question must be within the knowledge of the defendant, the questions
must be asked in good faith, and the scope of his cross-examination is
subject to the discretion of the trial court.35 Subsequent cases have lim-
ited this holding to prohibit the use of the words "arrest" or "indict-
ment" in cross-examination, allowing the prosecution to cross-examine
regarding the specific conduct which was the subject of the arrest or
indictment. 36 Any limiting effect that Williams ever had on prejudicial
cross-examination apparently no longer exists.
These restrictions on the North Carolina impeachment rule, dis-
cussed as substantive limitations, do not offer any broad protections
against prejudicial cross-examination. Defense counsel should not,
however, overlook them in the special circumstances where they apply.
Admittedly, with current court practices, one may seldom have the op-
portunity to invoke the retroactive effect of Gideon v. Wainwright37 to
limit cross-examination. Nevertheless, if a defendant can testify that he
was either not represented by appointed counsel or that he was unable
to afford counsel at a prior trial, this may be all that is necessary to
preclude damaging cross-examination.38 Such testimony should be of-
fered outside the presence of the jury or, better still, the fact of the void
conviction should be presented in support of a motion in limine.
Although later Supreme Court decisions may narrow the effect of the
Agnello- Walder exclusionary rule,39 the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in United States v. Walder4 ° remains effective. In State v.
Ross,4 the North Carolina Supreme Court plainly stated the require-
ments of the rule. To avoid impeachment with the facts surrounding
an unlawful search, two requirements must be met: (1) the defendant
must not have opened the door by reference to the evidence during
direct testimony; and (2) a constitutional violation or a "substantial vi-
olation" of North Carolina General Statute section 15A-974 must ap-
pear in the record.42 The result in Ross suggests that counsel should
include a transcript of the suppression hearing in the record.4 3 Again, a
constitutional violation or violation of section 15A-974 may serve as a
basis for a motion in limine for an order restricting the cross-examina-
tion prior to trial.
35. Id.
36. See text accompanying notes 55-59 infra.
37. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See text accompanying notes 26-31 supra.
38. State v. Vincent, 35 N.C. App. 369, 241 S.E.2d 390 (1978).
39. See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
40. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
41. 295 N.C. 488, 246 S.E.2d 780 (1978).
42. Id at 492, 246 S.E.2d at 784.
43. Id. See also State v. Foster, 284 N.C. 259, 200 S.E.2d 782 (1973) (Bobbitt, C.J.,
dissenting).
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B. The Good Faith Requirement
The prosecution is bound to exercise good faith when cross-examin-
ing a defendant with respect to past convictions or specific acts of mis-
conduct." "Good faith" is the conceptual chopping block of the North
Carolina impeachment rule. Six present or former justices of the North
Carolina Supreme Court have expressed serious reservations about the
practical effectiveness of the good faith requirement." What is good
faith? Good faith simply means that the cross-examiner must have a
factual basis for his questions. The good faith requirement is designed
to shield a defendant from the prejudice of groundless insinuation,46
not from prejudicial questions for which there is a factual basis. Nor
does the good faith requirement restrict the prosecutor's conduct dur-
ing cross-examination. 47 The manner of questioning is a separate and
distinct issue, not addressed by the good faith rule.
State v. Leonard48 contains a good statement of the good faith rule
and the distinction between factual basis and manner of cross-examina-
tion. In Leonard, defendant was on trial for murder. She had previ-
ously been acquitted of a Florida killing by reason of insanity. In
response to a preliminary motion, the trial court ordered that no im-
peachment would be allowed with respect to a prior killing if the de-
fendant had been acquitted by reason of insanity. Defense counsel
requested a Police Information Network (PIN) report from the prose-
cution but was not given the report until after the district attorney had
violated the order. Defendant claimed the prosecution's failure to pro-
vide her with the report was in bad faith. The court stated:
The rule in this jurisdiction is that the prosecutor must act in good
faith in his cross-examination of a defendant about prior specific acts of
misconduct. That is to say, the prosecutor must have a reasonable and
sufficient basis for his belief that defendant committed this specific act
of misconduct before he may properly cross-examine a defendant con-
44. D. STANSBURY, supra note 7, §§ 111-112.
45. State v. Foster, 284 N.C. 259, 278, 200 S.E.2d 782, 796 (1973). In dissent, Chief Justice
Bobbitt criticized the good faith rule which permits cross-examination with respect to specific acts
of misconduct but prohibits the prosecution from asking a defendant whether he was arrested or
indicted for the same conduct. Chief Justice Bobbitt recognized the danger that questions phrased
from arrest records and indictments may be impermissibly insinuating.
In the following cases, other justices also recognized this danger and the particularly unjust
prejudice resulting when the defendant was not convicted of the conduct forming the basis of the
arrest or indictment: State v. Royal, 300 N.C. 515, 531, 268 S.E.2d 517, 528 (1980) (Exum, J.,
dissenting; joined by Carlton, J.); State v. Leonard, 300 N.C. 223, 242, 266 S.E.2d 631, 643 (1980)
(Copeland, J., dissenting; joined by Exum, J. and Carlton, J.); State v. Herbin, 298 N.C. 441, 452,
259 S.E.2d 263, 271 (1979) (Exum, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); State v. Ross, 295
N.C. 488, 494, 246 S.E.2d 780, 785 (1978) (Exum, J., dissenting; joined by Sharpe, C.J. and Lake,
J.); State v. McLean, 294 N.C. 623, 635, 242 S.E.2d 814, 821 (1978) (Exum, J., dissenting).
46. D. STANSBURY, supra note 7, §§ 111-112.
47. Id. § I11.
48. 300 N.C. 223, 266 S.E.2d 631 (1980).
8
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cerning such act of misconduct. Otherwise a prosecutor conceivably
could ask a defendant about any act of misconduct which the prosecu-
tor decides to ask whether it has any basis in reality or is only a figment
of imagination. Such unfounded cross-examination of a defendant
must not be permitted, as its unfairness and prejudice to a defendant is
obvious. Therefore, bad faith in this fashion on the part of a prosecutor
required a new trial because of prejudice to the defendant.
In the case now being considered, the defendant would have us ex-
tend the "good faith" rule to the conduct of the prosecutor. This we
refuse to do for the PIN report provided the prosecutor sufficient basis
for his questions to the defendant.49
Clearly, a prior conviction record provides a sufficient factual basis
for a prosecutor's questions regarding the defendant's previous crimi-
nal acts. In addition, the conviction record warns the defendant and
counsel of definite areas that may be the subject of cross-examination.
Knowing the risks, the defendant may elect not to testify or to prepare
for the impeachment which may follow. 0 After the decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Watkins v.
Foster5 and Foster v. Barbour,52 it was thought that North Carolina
courts would require a "conviction" basis for cross-examination relat-
ing to specific acts of criminal conduct.53 In both of these habeas
corpus proceedings, petitioners challenged the prosecutor's good faith
during cross-examination. In Foster v. Barbour, the defendant was
tried and convicted of first degree murder. He contended in his peti-
tion that the prosecutor had not exercised good faith in cross-examin-
ing him with questions relating to four robberies and larcenies. Each of
the charges referred to in his cross-examination had been dismissed or
nolprossed. In Watkins v. Foster, the petitioner had been convicted of
first degree burglary. He claimed the prosecution had exercised bad
faith when he was cross-examined with highly detailed questions taken
from six pending indictments. 4 All of the indictments which were the
basis for his cross-examination were later dismissed. In short, defend-
ant Foster contended that the indictments were not a sufficient basis for
good faith.
To understand the importance of the fourth circuit decisions in Bar-
bour and Watkins, it is necessary to consider the development of the
49. Id. at 240-41, 266 S.E.2d at 642 (emphasis added).
50. Bogan, Evidence - The Fourth Circuit Threatens Impeachment with Prior Acts of Miscon-
duct in North Carolina - Watkins v. Foster, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 447, 463-64 (1979).
51. 570 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1978).
52. 462 F. Supp. 582 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
53. See generally Bogan, supra note 50.
54. The questions all detailed facts for the indictments. For example, "Q. I will ask you if
you didn't break into Lonnie Bell Wallace's house on February 20, 1971, between 6:30 and 11:00
and by breaking out the center glass window in the front door?" 284 N.C. 259, 282, 200 S.E.2d
782, 798.
9
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good faith standard at the time the cases arose. In State v. Williams55
the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the prosecution may not
cross-examine a defendant by asking whether he has been indicted or
arrested for criminal conduct. In dicta, however, the Court preserved
the prosecution's right to inquire into specific acts of unlawful conduct
if the inquiry relates to matters within the defendant's knowledge, the
questions are asked in good faith, and the questioning is subject to the
discretion of the trial court.56 The importance of this dicta became ap-
parent in the North Carolina decisions of State v. Mack57 and State v.
Gainey.58 In those cases it was settled that, while a prosecutor may not
question a defendant concerning his indictment or arrest, the prosecu-
tor may, in good faith, question him concerning specific acts of miscon-
duct which form the basis of an indictment or arrest. In Mack and
Gainey, the district attorney based his questions on arrest records or
indictments, but the defendants failed to raise the question whether the
records or indictments were sufficient to meet the requirement of good
faith. In State v. Lowery5 9 and State v. Foster6" (the predecessor of
Watkins v. Foster), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that an
indictment constituted a sufficient factual basis for good faith. Thus,
Lowery and Foster produced the incongruous result that the prosecu-
tion could not question a defendant using the words "arrest" or "indict-
ment", but the same arrest records or indictments could serve as a good
faith basis for questioning of the defendant on the underlying conduct
which had led to those arrests or indictments.
In both Watkins v. Foster and Foster v. Barbour, federal courts found
that the state lacked good faith in its cross-examination. In Watkins v.
Foster, the state's case linking the defendant with a burglary consisted
largely of a single fingerprint found on a flower pot that had rested on a
stolen television. Defendant presented evidence of his good character
55. 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174 (1971), distinguished in State v. Tuttle, 33 N.C. App. 465,
235 S.E.2d 412 (1977).
56. See text accompanying notes 32-36 supra.
57. 282 N.C. 334, 193 S.E.2d 71 (1972). Defendant Mack, on trial for murder, was ques-
tioned about fourteen prior offenses in the following manner: "Directing your attention back to
the year 1950, did you assault someone with a deadly weapon which resulted in serious injury?"
1d. at 341, 193 S.E.2d at 76.
58. 280 N.C. 366, 185 S.E.2d 874 (1972). In Gainey defendant was asked if he had not been
"arrested" the night before the robbery for which he was tried. This case was decided in the same
session as State P. Williams. The court, however, relying on dicta in Williams determined that the
facts and circumstances did not warrant a new trial. 280 N.C. at 373, 185 S.E.2d at 879.
59. 286 N.C. 698, 213 S.E.2d 255 (1975). Lowery was on trial for first degree rape. During
cross-examination, the district attorney questioned him about a subsequent rape indictment
against him by asking: "On April 5, 1974, didn't you insert your private parts into Kathy Cox?"
1d. at 707, 213 S.E.2d at 261. Despite the similarity between this question and the charge, the
North Carolina Supreme Court ruled only that the indictment was "ample basis" for the question;
the prejudicial import of the question was not considered.
60. 284 N.C. 259, 200 S.E.2d 782 (1973).
10
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and the alibi that he had spent the evening of the alleged burglary with
his family. The court noted that all of the outstanding indictments
forming the substance of the cross-examination were later dismissed
and that one had been dismissed at the time of his trial. In Foster v.
Barbour, the federal district court found that defendant's conviction for
first degree murder rested largely on the testimony given by a com-
panion who had entered into a plea bargain agreement. This witness
and the defendant had a falling out following the alleged murder, and
the witness admitted his motivation for revenge against the defendant
during cross-examination. The outcome of both of these cases de-
pended on the weight given the defendant's credibility. With language
contained in Watkins v. Foster and later repeated in Foster v. Barbour,
both courts condemned the prejudice engendered by the prosecution's
questioning:
The prosecutor concededly could not and did not offer any extrinsic
evidence that Foster had committed the six acts. However, his ques-
tions alone, although answered in the negative by Foster, must have left
an indelible impression on the minds of the jury. Foster's entire de-
fense rested on his credibility, and thus the prosecutor's attack on this
credibility was critical. Foster's denial of the prosecutor's insinuations
in theory should have left his credibility intact but in actuality could
not erase the blemish on his character which had been left in each ju-
ror's mind.6'
The decisions in Watkins and Barbour would presumably have some
effect on North Carolina appellate decisions. This has simply not been
the case. The progression of case law from State v. Williams to State v.
Foster remains largely undisturbed. 62 More alarmingly, North Caro-
lina courts have extended the holdings of Williams and Foster to permit
cross-examination regarding specific acts of misconduct for which a de-
fendant had previously been acquitted.63 In its present form in North
61. 570 F.2d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 1978).
62. The North Carolina courts have distinguished the fourth circuit cases where arguments
from these cases have been made. State v. Lynch, 300 N.C. 534, 268 S.E.2d 161 (1980); State v.
Thompson, 37 N.C. App. 651, 247 S.E.2d 235 (1978). In Lynch, the court adhered to the rule
developed from Williams stating:
A defendant who takes the witness stand can be cross-examined for impeachment purposes
about prior convictions. A defendant may also be cross-examined for impeachment purposes
about prior specific acts of misconduct so long as the questions are asked in good faith. The
district attorney may not ask about or refer in his questions to prior arrests, indictments,
charges or accusations.
Id. at 543, 268 S.E.2d at 166 (citations omitted).
63. State v. Royal, 300 N.C. 515, 268 S.E.2d 517 (1980) (in an armed robbery case, the court
permitted cross-examination concerning a prior kidnapping-robbery for which no probable cause
was found); State v. Leonard, 300 N.C. 223, 266 S.E.2d 631 (1980) (in a murder case, the court
permitted cross-examination with respect to a prior killing although defendant was acquitted by
reason of insanity); State v. Herbin, 298 N.C. 441, 259 S.E.2d 263 (1979) (in a murder trial, it was
proper to cross-examine the defendant about a prior rape, as specific misconduct, where he was
found guilty of assault on a female); State v. Purcell, 296 N.C. 728, 252 S.E.2d 772 (1979) (in a
11
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Carolina, the good faith requirement has become a judicially approved
method of trying a defendant for his past actions.
The best arguments against the abuses arising under the good faith
requirement of cross-examination are those urging the abolition or
modification of the present standard. The most serious flaw is the para-
doxical quality of the good faith standard. Evidence of a defendant's
credibility is arguably collateral in nature. Although such evidence is
not technically admissible during the state's case-in-chief, it may be of-
fered during cross-examination of the defendant. The prosecutor is
bound by the defendant's denial of past misconduct and cannot offer
collateral evidence in rebuttal. On the other hand, the defendant can-
not offer any evidence to rebut the implications left by the prosecutor's
questions.64 Thus, when a criminal defendant with any type of crimi-
nal record testifies, he takes the risk that he will be tried on collateral
evidence of his past conduct without an opportunity to rebut the infer-
ences launched by cross-examination. One writer has noted: "That is
the paradox of the good faith rule. The rule attempts to assure truth
without proof, and yet challenging good faith requires proof."65
Defects in the application of the rule also suggest arguments for its
modification. Theoretically, the rule protects a witness from the
prejudice of groundless insinuation. But the rule permitting a criminal
defendant to be cross-examined from an arrest warrant or indictment
breeds insinuation of a much more lethal sort. Detailed questions
taken from arrest records or indictments not only suggest the defend-
ant's complicity to the jury but also suggest some authority for the
questions asked.66
When the rule permitting cross-examination on the basis of indict-
ments or arrest records is extended to allow cross-examination with re-
spect to specific acts of misconduct where no conviction resulted, the
potential for greater unfairness exists. If a criminal defendant cannot
be cross-examined concerning convictions that resulted when he was
without counsel or unadvisedly pled guilty to a crime, he should not be
cross-examined about criminal misconduct for which he was acquitted.
Justice Exum has written: "When one has been tried for and acquitted
of a particular crime that should end the matter for all purposes. A
murder trial, defendant was cross-examined about a prior killing where conviction did not result),
see text accompanying notes 79-86 infra; State v. Ross, 295 N.C. 488, 246 S.E.2d 780 (1978) (a
drug case in which the court permitted cross-examination pertaining to prior drug charges that
had been dismissed).
64. In State v. Lynch, 300 N.C. 534, 268 S.E.2d 161 (1980), defendant was tried for kidnap-
ping and rape. During cross-examination, mention was made of federal charges arising from the
same incident, but defendant was not permitted to present evidence in rebuttal that these charges
had resulted in mistrial. Id. at 550-51, 268 S.E.2d at 171.
65. Bogan, supra note 50, at 461.
66. D. STANSBURY, supra note 7, § 112.
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person so acquitted should not be required continually to defend him-
self against the charge in subsequent criminal proceedings in which he
may become involved."67
C. Manner of Cross-Examination
As mentioned earlier, the North Carolina good faith standard is
designed to prevent the prejudice that arises from unfounded accusa-
tions offered through cross-examination. The issue of prejudice im-
parted by the manner or content of the questioning is not a component
of good faith. Two lines of cases discussing the manner of cross-exami-
nation offer reasonable arguments to support motions in limine.
In one line of cases, and in several dissents,68 North Carolina courts
have deplored cross-examination conducted in an impermissibly insin-
uating manner. The problem becomes the identification of impermissi-
ble insinuation. State v. Phillps69 provides the chief criteria. The
defendant in Phillios appealed his conviction for obtaining money by
false pretenses. Much of the cross-examination of the defendant re-
lated to his activities as a police officer.7 ° The prosecutor questioned
him about his involvement in the robbery of a post office, accepting
bribes, and filing fraudulent insurance claims.7" Defense counsel ob-
jected to the questions on the basis that they were tantamount to
prosecutorial testimony.72 On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme
Court agreed with the defendant that prosecutorial misconduct war-
ranted a new trial. The court stressed the objectionable manner of the
questioning.
When he phrased the seventeen questions under scrutiny and pro-
67. State v. Herbin, 298 N.C. 441, 453, 259 S.E.2d 263, 271 (Exum, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
68. State v. Foster, 284 N.C. 259, 200 S.E.2d 782 (1973). Commenting on the impropriety of
the cross-examination concerning the outstanding indictments, Chief Justice Bobbitt dissented:
"The asking of these questions gave the impression that the State's counsel had knowledge of
evidential facts sufficient to support these insinuations." Id. at 283-84, 200 S.E.2d at 799. See also
State v. Ross, 295 N.C. 488, 246 S.E.2d 780 (1978); State v. McLean, 294 N.C. 623, 242 S.E.2d 814
(1978).
69. 240 N.C. 516, 82 S.E.2d 762 (1954).
70. Id. at 522-23, 82 S.E.2d 766-67. Part of the questioning proceeded as follows:
(7) Well, now I'll ask you that if you don't know that on July 15, 1950, if you didn't take
from a boy by the name of Jack Shields the sum of $125.00 and take the money and tell him
you were gonna give it to the mayor down there to pay his fine when you arrested him for
driving under the influence?
(8) And, if you didn't keep that money and fail to turn it in?
(9) I'll ask you if you don't remember telling Jack Shields, when he came to see about the
matter, after he had paid you the $125.00, that you had already talked to him and the mayor
said it was alright to reduce the charge to reckless driving and driving with improper brakes
and he could pay you the sum of $125.00, that you told him he didn't have to come to court,
and if you don't know you didn't turn the money in to the mayor?
71. Id.
72. Id. at 524, 82 S.E.2d at 767.
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pounded them to the male defendant, the solicitor assumed the un-
proved insinuations in them to be facts, and in that way assured the
jury upon his official authority that the male defendant had burglarized
a Post Office, suborned the commission of perjury, committed thefts,
asked for and received bribes . . . [and committed various misdeeds].
It thus appears that in cross-examining the male defendant, the solic-
itor repeatedly violated the rules of law which forbid a prosecuting at-
torney to inject into the trial of a cause to the prejudice of the accused
by argument or by insinuating questions supposed facts for which there
is no evidence."
In reaching its decision, the supreme court reasoned that by his ques-
tions the prosecutor had abrogated the rule that the state is bound by
the answers of a witness when it cross-examines him for impeachment
purposes. In characterizing the questions, the court stated:
The questions were ostensibly designed in large degree to elicit from
the male defendant impeaching matters of a collateral character. They
were so framed, however, as to assert in advance the untruth of his deni-
als. In consequence, they deprived him of the benefit of the evidential
rule that the State is bound by the answers of the accused or any other
witness for the defense when it cross-examines him as to collateral mat-
ters for the purpose of impeachment.74
In viewing the questions, the court concluded that the solicitor had in-
tended to "portray the male defendant to the jurors as a bad man of
criminal practices and proclivities by insinuations of specific acts of
misconduct which he knew he could not bring to their attention by
legally admissible evidence. 75 Undoubtedly, these same criticisms
could be aimed at many cross-examinations otherwise proper under the
good faith standard.
In addition, North Carolina courts have limited the detail in which a
defendant-witness may be cross-examined about prior convictions. In
State v. Finch ,76 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that where a
witness, including a defendant, admits a prior conviction he may be
questioned about the time and place of the conviction. However, a
showing of conviction is a prerequisite to the right to inquire into the
punishment imposed for a criminal conviction. 77 In significant lan-
guage, the supreme court recognized the danger of jury distraction and
confusion when a defendant is impeached with details of a conviction.
It stated:
73. Id. at 523-24, 82 S.E.2d at 767 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 524, 82 S.E.2d at 768 (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 527-28, 82 S.E.2d at 770.
76. 293 N.C. 132, 235 S.E.2d 819 (1977). During cross-examination the state's witness denied
a prior conviction. Defendant claimed error when the trial court refused to allow the witness to
respond to defense counsel's question asking the witness if he had not paid a fine because of the
offense. Id. at 140-41, 235 S.E.2d at 824.
77. Id. at 142, 235 S.E.2d at 825.
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Strong policy reasons support the principle that ordinarily one may not
go into the details of the crime by which the witness is being im-
peached. Such details unduly distract the jury from the issues properly
before it, harass the witness and inject confusion into the trial of the
case. Nevertheless, where a conviction has been established, a limited
inquiry into the time and place of conviction and the punishment im-
posed is proper. Such examination, so limited in scope, permits the
jury to more actively gauge the credibility of the witness while mini-
mizing the distraction inherent in any collateral inquiry.78
In another line of decisions, North Carolina courts have also cau-
tioned against cross-examination on specific acts of misconduct that is
too general or does not convey the wrongful nature of the conduct. In
State v. Mason , the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a wit-
ness may be cross-examined concerning prior specific acts, but the
questions must describe a particular act. In that case, defense counsel
asked the state's witness, "Were you involved in what you call a street
gang operation in New York?""0 The state's objection to the question
was properly sustained because "street gang operation" did not concern
a particular act.
In State v. Purcell,8 the court further developed the specific act re-
quirement. Defendant Purcell, on trial for murder, had been tried but
not convicted in a prior killing. He claimed the trial court committed
prejudicial error by not sustaining his objection when the prosecutor
asked in reference to the prior killing, "You have killed somebody, ha-
ven't you Mr. Purcell?" and, "[I]t was known all over town you killed
somebody, weren't [sic] it?"
82
78. Id. at 141, 235 S.E.2d at 824 (citations omitted).
79. 295 N.C. 584, 248 S.E.2d 241 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 984 (1979).
80. Id. at 592, 248 S.E.2d at 247.
81. 296 N.C. 728, 252 S.E.2d 772 (1979). Defendant petitioned the court for discretionary
review of his manslaughter conviction. Defendant was having an affair with the deceased's wife
and the killing occurred during a quarrel. Id. at 728-29, 252 S.E.2d at 773.
82. Id. at 730, 252 S.E.2d at 773. A portion of the cross-examination was:
Q. You have killed somebody haven't you, Mr. Purcell?
MR. STEWART: Object, your Honor.
A. I haven't never been found guilty of murder.
COURT: Overruled.
Q. I didn't ask you that?
MR. STEWART: Your Honor, we submit he can ask him what he has been tried and con-
victed of.
COURT: He asked him a direct question 'If he killed somebody' that is a proper question.




Q. Yes or no?
A. Yes, sir.
EXCEPTION NO. I
Q. Well, it was known all around town that you killed somebody weren't it?
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The supreme court held the cross-examination in the first incident-
"You have killed somebody haven't you, Mr. Purcell?"-was improper
for two reasons. First, under the holding of Mason,s3 the question must
be more than categorical; it must refer to a particular act.84 Second,
because the purpose of character impeachment is to expose the jury to
prior acts weighing against the witness' credibility, the questions must
convey the wrongful nature of the questioned act. In the words of the
court:
Questions so loosely phrased as the one here give the jury no clear indi-
cation about the witness's credibility. Under our law and the mores of
our society, killing is not categorically wrong . . . . Indeed, a soldier
who kills the enemy in war may be thought a hero. When a question is
put to a witness about some prior act for the purpose of impeaching his
credibility, and the question does not show by its phrasing that the act
was wrongful, an objection to it should be sustained. 5
The court also found the second inquiry-"[I]t was known all over
town you killed somebody, weren't [sic] it?"-to be improper. Basing
its decision on the hearsay and accusatory nature of an indictment or
arrest warrant, the court in State v. Williams86 had held that a witness
could not be cross-examined about his arrests or indictments. The Wil-
liams court also had stated that when conduct that was the subject of
an arrest or indictment is the subject of cross-examination as a specific




Q. Did you hear my question?
A. No, I didn't.
MR. STEWART: Object to arguing with the witness, your Honor.
COURT: Overruled.
Q. It was known all around town that you had killed somebody weren't it?
MR. STEWART: Object.
COURT: Overruled.
A. Yes, sir. They've said I've killed somebody. I wasn't found guilty of - I wasn't found
guilty of murder.




Q. This is the second person you have killed?
A. That is the second person I've been charged with.
EXCEPTION NO. 2.
ld. at 729-30, 252 S.E.2d at 773-74.
83. State v. Mason, 295 N.C. 584, 248 S.E.2d 241 (1978). See cases cited in State v. Purcell,
296 N.C. 728, 733, 252 S.E.2d 772, 775 (1979).
84. 296 N.C. 728, 733, 252 S.E.2d 772, 775.
85. Id. The argument has been made, unsuccessfully, that prior acts of misconduct commit-
ted while a defendant-witness was found to be insane should not be the subject of cross-examina-
tion because such acts are not wrongful. State v. Leonard, 300 N.C. 223, 266 S.E.2d 631 (1980); id.
at 245, 266 S.E.2d at 644 (Copeland, J., dissenting).
86. 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174 (1971).
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act of misconduct, it must be a matter within the knowledge of the
defendant. Similarly, the court in Purcell held that a defendant may
not be cross-examined regarding community knowledge of his prior
bad actions because such knowledge amounts to an informal accusa-
tion.87 Under Williams, the cross-examination must pertain to matters
within defendant's knowledge, not the accusations of others.
88
The preceding cases offer defense counsel the raw materials for effec-
tive legal arguments. They stand for three premises. First, the charac-
ter impeachment by cross-examination with respect to specific acts of
misconduct must refer to a particular act. By comparing cases in which
cross-examination was improperly insinuating with those in which it
was too categorical in nature, the argument may be made on the facts
of a particular case that cross-examination was either too detailed (in-
sinuating) or not detailed enough (categorical). Second, the cross-ex-
amination must convey the wrongful nature of the conduct. Arguably,
the prosecution cannot cross-examine a defendant about his arrests or
indictments, nor can it cross-examine him in totally generic terms.
When the prosecution cross-examines a defendant about a particular
act of misconduct, these limitations increase the necessity that details
be included-details which could be prejudicially insinuating to the de-
fendant-witness. Third, questioning a defendant-witness about acts of
misconduct as a matter of common knowledge is not permissible under
State v. Williams. Questions phrased this way presumably are based
on a hearsay and accusatory information and do not necessarily pertain
to matters within defendant's knowledge.
D. Prejudicial Effect of Cross-Examination with Similar Crimes
The North Carolina impeachment rule permitting cross-examination
concerning any prior conviction or misconduct has its most prejudicial
effect on the defendant when he is cross-examined regarding similar
crimes or acts before the jury. The question should be asked: Are the
crimes or acts so similar that the prejudice will prevent the defendant
from receiving a fair trial? However, with one exception, it can be
stated that North Carolina courts do not consider the prejudicial effect
that cross-examination with prior similar acts or crimes will have. The
North Carolina Supreme Court has stated:
It is well established in this State that when the defendant in a crimi-
nal action becomes a witness in his own behalf, he is subject to cross-
examination like any other witness and, for the purpose of impeach-
ment, may be asked about his prior convictions, including those for
87. 296 N.C. at 733-34, 252 S.E.2d at 775.
88. Id.
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offenses similar to that for which he is presently on trial. 89
Even though this is North Carolina's basic position, there is at least
one instance in which the similarity of prior convictions is significant in
cross-examination. In State v. Williams,90 the court held that defendant
may not be cross-examined by inquiring whether he was arrested or
indicted for a particular offense. The court also mentioned that viola-
tions of the rule would not always require a new trial. Rather, the facts
and circumstances of a given case would determine whether a new trial
was necessary. Consequently, appellate courts must make two determi-
nations: first, whether an error has occurred; and second, whether the
prejudicial nature of the error merits a new trial. When a trial court
erroneously allows the introduction of impermissible cross-examina-
tion (cross-examination not grounded in good faith), defense counsel
must show not only that error occurred, but that the error was so preju-
dicial as to warrant a new trial. In State v. Stimpson, ' for example,
defendant was tried for murder in the killing of a bootlegger. Defend-
ant did not deny the shooting, but he testified that his gun had dis-
charged accidentally during a dispute. He claimed the trial court erred
in allowing the prosecution to cross-examine him by asking whether he
had been indicted for murder in New York. The court found the error
so prejudicial as to require a new trial. The court stated:
Defendant, on trial for murder, offered evidence and contended that
the discharge of the pistol was accidental and not intentional. Under
these circumstances, the admission of the testimony, for the purposes of
impeachment, to the effect that he had been indicted in New York state
in 1964 for murder was prejudicial.
92
The importance of these cases is that similarity between conduct that
is the subject of cross-examination and the offense before the jury will
not be grounds for reversal, even though the similarity is generally
prejudicial. However, prejudicial similarity may satisfy the "facts and
circumstances" requirement of Williams in combination with another
error. Counsel should not overlook cases in which the courts have
stated that the similarity between the conduct and the offenses for
which the defendant was tried was prejudicial. 93
89. State v. Cook, 280 N.C. 642, 647, 187 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1972). Defendant was charged in
the rape of an eight year old girl. He moved that the trial court restrict mention of his prior sex
offenses if he choose to testify. He claimed "that to pehnit the State, on cross-examination, to
inquire into these offenses . . . would be highly prejudicial and so, impermissible." Id.
90. 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174 (1971). See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
91. 279 N.C. 716, 185 S.E.2d 168 (1971).
92. 279 N.C. at 725, 185 S.E.2d at 173.
93. State v. Purcell, 296 N.C. 728, 733, 252 S.E.2d 772, 775 (1979); 4 N.C. Index 3d, Crim.
Law § 86.
Special attention should be paid to the recent North Carolina Supreme Court decision in
State v. Williams, 303 N.C. 142, 277 S.E.2d 434 (1981). In Williams, the defendant was tried for
the rape of a seventeen-year-old girl. After his testimony on direct examination, the district attor-
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II. EFFECTIVE TACTIqS MITIGATING THE NORTH CAROLINA
IMPEACHMENT RULE
Defense counsel may mitigate the harshness of the North Carolina
impeachment rule in three ways. First, in order to utilize whatever pro-
tections are available under case law or the Constitution,94 counsel
must establish a clear record. Where the record is silent as to any basis
for bad faith, a trial judge's actions in determining the scope of cross-
examination will be presumed correct.95 In addition, counsel should
not neglect to request a limiting instruction to the jury. If a defendant
does not request a limiting instruction at trial, he cannot later claim
that the court's failure to instruct the jury constituted error.96
Second, defense counsel may attempt to circumvent prejudicial
cross-examination through the use of a pretrial motion in limine. In
addition to other benefits, a pretrial motion in limine gives counsel an
opportunity to assess the potential damage from impeachment and to
determine, in advance of trial, whether to advise a defendant to testify.
Obtaining a pretrial order saves time and avoids delay during the trial.
Although it is extremely difficult to obtain a totally restrictive order in
limine prior to trial, defense counsel should seek such an order to pre-
serve the record and to place the trial court and prosecution on notice.
Third, defense counsel may challenge the good faith basis of the
prosecution by requesting voir dire. Although North Carolina's good
faith rule permits cross-examination relating to specific acts of miscon-
duct on almost any factual basis, including arrests and indictments,
there is always a possibility that the prosecution may not conform its
ney questioned the defendant regarding a previous rape conviction involving another seventeen-
year-old girl. After the defendant acknowledged the previous conviction, the prosecutor began a
series of questions concerning the particulars of the prior offense. Defense counsel objected to
each question. The trial court sustained each objection, but permitted the prosecutor to continue
asking question after question. The effect was undoubtedly prejudicial since the particulars of the
prior offense were placed before the jury in the prosecutor's questions in spite of the court's ruling
on defense counsel's objections. The North Carolina Supreme Court, citing State v. Foster, held
that no error existed because the trial court had sustained all objections. Id. at 147, 277 S.E.2d at
438. The supreme court obviously has not addressed the issue of "wafting," whereby the jury
becomes aware of circumstances and inferences not properly before them in evidence in a criminal
case. The Williams trial court should have instructed the prosecutor to change the course of his
cross-examination long before he did. The supreme court again refused to address the "wafting"
issue. With the type of analysis presented by the supreme court in Williams, prosecutors need not
worry about reversals so long as the trial court has sustained every objection by the defense coun-
sel, even though he has allowed the prosecution to ask every objectionable question imaginable. It
is suggested that, in a situation such as Williams, counsel should object to the first question and
immediately move the trial court to direct the prosecutor to change the subject of his cross-exami-
nation to avoid the "wafting" danger. See also State v. Oxendine, 303 N.C. 235, 244, 278 S.E.2d
200, 207 (1981).
94. See text accompanying note 20-31 supra.
95. State v. Gaiten, 277 N.C. 236, 240, 176 S.E.2d 778, 782 (1970) (alternative holdings).
96. State v. Brower, 289 N.C. 644, 664, 224 S.E.2d 551, 565 (1976) (dictum); State v. Wil-
liams, 272 N.C. 273, 275, 158 S.E.2d 85, 86-87 (1967) (dictum).
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questions to the facts.97 In some cases, the district attorney may pro-
ceed in the honest belief that his facts are correct. If he is proceeding
on erroneous facts, as in the case of misleading arrest reports or mis-
taken indictments, he should bear some of the responsibility for placing
this misinformation before the jury. The jury has no way of determin-
ing the prosecution's factual basis and, more often than not, will proba-
bly assume the truth of the facts asserted. Once the trial has begun, a
voir dire hearing to determine good faith is the only option remaining
to safeguard the defendant from erroneous, if not prejudicial, cross-
examination. In spite of this, a number of factors negate the usefulness
of voir dire. In the first place, the granting of a voir dire hearing is
permissible but not required under the holding of State v. Gaiten.98 A
voir dire examination, if granted, would certainly consume trial time
and additional time may be necessary for defense counsel to present the
evidence rebutting the factual basis.99
A. The Motion in Limine
Requesting a limiting instruction or voir dire to assure good faith are
probably the only steps counsel may take once cross-examination oc-
curs. Both may be impotent measures against the bias caused by sug-
gestive questioning. Even where the questioning is so outrageous that
counsel should request a motion to strike, he may choose not to if he
believes the motion to strike will increase the jury's awareness of the
material. Aside from these considerations, what may defense counsel
do when he knows of inflammatory material in his client's past, but he
believes the client's testimony will be critical in determining the
case? 100
The most obvious solution is the motion in limine. With the motion,
the court determines the prejudicial nature of the evidence outside the
presence of the jury before any mention is made at trial. The North
Carolina Supreme Court has recently stated: "Any motion which can
be made at trial can, if the facts are known beforehand, be made before
trial."'' Statutory authority for the motion may be found in North
97. In State v. McLean, 294 N.C. 623, 634, 242 S.E.2d 814, 821 (1978), the prosecution erro-
neously questioned the defendant charged with rape about a prior conviction for tampering with a
vehicle occupied by a female. In fact, defendant was not charged with tampering with an occu-
pied vehicle. Neither the arrest records nor the disposition in the case supplied the factual basis
for the cross-examination. See also Foster v. Barbour, 462 F. Supp. 582 (1978); text accompany-
ing notes 51-61 supra.
98. 277 N.C. at 240, 176 S.E.2d at 782 (dictum).
99. See Bogan, supra note 50, at 465-66.
100. North Carolina does not restrict cross-examination to crimes less than ten years old to
prevent impeachment with remote crimes, as do the federal rules. Infractions committed as a
teenager may pose a threat in North Carolina.
101. State v. Tate, 300 N.C. 180, 182, 265 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1980).
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Carolina General Statutes sections 15A-952,11 2 and 15A-971 to -979
dealing with the suppression of evidence. 0 3 However, the bottom line
remains that the granting of the motion in limine is a matter within the
court's discretion. Defense counsel must use their best efforts in mak-
ing a persuasive motion. The following section will concentrate on
methods that may increase the likelihood of such a motion being
granted, strategy in offering the motion, and defense counsel's recourse
if the court denies his motion or the order granting it is violated.
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-952 (1978). In pertinent part, the statute provides: "(a) Any
defense, objection, or request which is capable of being determined without trial of the general
issue may be raised before trial by motion . . . (f) When a motion is made before trial, the court
in its discretion may hear the motion before trial, on the date set for arraignment, on the date set
for trial before a jury is empanelled, or during trial." Approved in State v. Tate, 300 N.C. 180, 265
S.E.2d 223 (1980).
103. In State v. Tate, 300 N.C. 180, 184, 265 S.E.2d 223, 226 (1980), North Carolina's Supreme
Court stated: "[Wihen a motion to suppress is made in limine, the applicable article, whether the
defendant refers to it in motion or not, is Article 53 of Chapter 15A, and more specifically, G.S.
15A-979." See note 117 infra. In pertinent parts, Article 53 provides:
Motion to suppress evidence in superior and district court; orders of suppression, effects of orders
and offailure to make motion ...
(b) An order finally denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed upon an ap-
peal from a judgment of conviction, including a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty.
(c) An order by the superior court granting a motion to suppress prior to trial is appealable
to the appellate division of the General Court of Justice prior to trial upon certificate by the
prosecutor to the judge who granted the motion that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of
delay and that the evidence is essential to the case.
(d) A motion to suppress evidence made pursuant to this Article is the exclusive method of
challenging the admissibility of evidence upon the grounds specified in G.S. 15A-974.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-979 (1978).
Exclusion of suppression of unlawfull, obtained evidence.-Upon timely motion evidence must
be suppressed if:
(1) Its exclusion is required by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of
the State of North Carolina; or
(2) It is obtained as a result of a substantial violation of the provisions of this Chapter ...
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-974 (1978).
Motion to suppress evidence in superior court prior to trial and during trial. - (a) In superior
court, the defendant may move to suppress evidence only prior to trial unless the defendant
did not have reasonable opportunity to make the motion before trial or unless a motion to
suppress is allowed during trial under subsection (b) or (c).
(b) A motion to suppress may be made for the first time during trial when the State has
failed to notify the defendant's counsel or, if he has none, the defendant sooner than 20
working days before trial, of its intention to use the evidence, and the evidence is:
(1) Evidence of a statement made by a defendant;
(2) Evidence obtained by virtue of a search warrant; or
(3) Evidence obtained as a result of search with a search warrant when the defendant was
not present at the time of the execution of the search warrant.
(c) If, after a pretrial determination and denial of the motion, the judge is satisfied, upon a
showing by the defendant, that additional pertinent facts have been discovered by the defend-
ant which he could not have discovered with reasonable diligence before the determination of
the motion, he may permit the defendant to renew the motion before the trial or, if not
possible because of the time of discovery of alleged new facts, during trial. When a misde-
meanor is appealed by the defendant for trial de novo in superior court, the State need not
give the notice required by this section.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-975 (1978).
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B. Essential Elements of a Motion in Limine
When counsel makes a motion in limine to restrict cross-examination
or to preclude other anticipated prejudicial material, he must show one
of the following: that presentation of the evidence in question will vio-
late an established rule of evidence; or, that the potential for prejudice
far outweighs the probative value of the evidence." ° To further con-
sideration, counsel should include applicable rules of evidence, avail-
able North Carolina precedents, and case law from other jurisdictions
that may be persuasive authority in support of his motion. 0 5 The court
of appeals has stated: "[T]he grounds for the motion should be clearly
stated therein and [should contain] support when appropriate by affida-
vit or other material. A pretrial ruling on the motion is not requested
unless movant properly supports his claim that prejudice will result if
the ruling is delayed until trial."' 6
In a comprehensive discussion of the motion in limine, 1°7 Henry
Rothblatt and David Leroy have suggested that the following elements
be included in support of every motion in limine:
(1) Reasons that indicate that the case is ready for and will be pro-
ceeding to trial.
(2) What the basic, relevant issues will be judging from the general
nature and specific circumstances of the case.
(3) That opposing counsel's conduct to date and other discovered
facts suggest that it is eminently probable, not merely speculative, that
a presentation of the contested evidence at trial is intended.
(4) What specific content, items, and inferences are sought to be
excluded, and the specific ways in which any reference will inflame the
passion, prejudice, hostility, sympathy or illogic of the jury, cause con-
fusion, or consume an inordinate amount of time.
(5) The respects in which this foreseeable jury reaction will result to
the detriment of the moving party's right to a fair trial.
(6) That the certain matter or testimony is:
(a) Inadmissible under the exclusionary rules of evidence and to
permit its offer at trial will raise the specified prejudice; or
(b) Of such minor legal relevance that the jury prejudice it will
create either outweighs its probative value or places it in a class of
104. Rothblatt and Leroy, The Motion in Limine in Criminal Trials.- A Techniquefor the Pre-
trialExclusion of Prejudicial Evidence, 60 Ky. L.J. 611, 621-22 (1972). STANSBURY, supra note 7 at
§ 80 states: "Even relevant evidence may, however, be subject to exclusion where its probative
force is comparatively weak and the likelihood of its playing upon the passions and prejudices of
the jury is great."
105. Rothblatt and Leroy, supra note 104, at 623.
106. State v. Tate, 44 N.C. App. 567, 570, 261 S.E.2d 506, 518 (1980), rev'd on other grounds,
300 N.C. 180, 256 S.E.2d 223 (1980).
107. Rothblatt and Leroy, supra note 104.
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prejudicial evidence that has been ruled generally inadmissible by
the courts.
(7) That to delay hearing the objection until the contested matter is
mentioned, shown, or offered in front of the jury would permit the prej-
udicial effects to be felt by the jurors and endanger a fair trial,
(8) That therefore the granting of the movant's motion in limine to
absolutely exclude the evidence, or to require preliminarily that any
offer be brought up first with the court alone, is an appropriate method
of preserving the fairness of the trial and isolating the jury from
prejudice.'08
C. Strategy in Offering the Motion in Limine
Counsel's strategy in offering a motion in limine depends on his pur-
pose for offering the motion and the type of relief he requests. 09 There
are basically two types of motions in limine: one in which counsel re-
quests an absolute pretrial ruling barring mention or comment on an
item of evidence; and another, in which counsel requests a preliminary
ruling ordering a separate hearing outside the presence of the jury dur-
ing the trial to determine the admissibility of the evidence. Different
considerations may prompt counsel to request, and the court to order,
either of the above. Unless the movant requests only suppression of
evidence, courts are more inclined to grant a preliminary order. This is
understandable where judges are uncertain of the relevance of material
in the forthcoming trial and do not want a built-in error on appeal.
Since a preliminary order in limine is not a final ruling on the evidence,
it is not appealable."' On the other hand, counsel may prefer to seek
an absolute order and prepare to argue the error should it be denied. I I
Once counsel has decided upon the purpose and type of motion he
wishes to make, he can tailor his strategy in offering the motion. The
motion should target the specific areas of information counsel wishes to
preclude from the jury. Ideally, the motion should be drawn narrowly
enough to indicate the prohibited areas, but broadly enough to prevent
the state from injecting prejudice." 2 In drafting the motion, it should
be born in mind that the motion may suggest evidence to the prosecu-
tion. Not offering a motion in limine may sometimes be the better tac-
108. Id. at 623-24.
109. Rothblatt and Leroy discuss in detail the strategic advantages that use of the motion in
limine may offer. These include strategies to maximize discovery, to preserve the record for ap-
peal, to force opponent limitations and to obtain favorable guilty pleas. Rothblatt and Leroy,
supra note 104, at 617-19. The scope of this worthwhile discussion exceeds that of this article.
110. See text accompanying notes 115-16 infra.
111. See generally, Rothblatt and Leroy, supra note 104.
112. Id. at 619. For a case in which the prosecution was able to suggest the consequences of a
verdict of innocence by reason of insanity over a motion in limine, see State v. Franks, 300 N.C. 1,
16, 265 S.E.2d 177, 186 (1980).
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tic. The timing of a motion in limine requires a certain amount of
intuition. A motion made very early before trial will sometimes find the
state unprepared to respond to the motion. However, a motion made
too early may permit the state to alter its strategy in the case or to
prepare to defeat the motion when the ruling is made at trial." 3 If
counsel makes a motion in limine with other trial motions, he should
request a separate ruling on the motion in limine." 4
D. Defense Counsel's Recourse After a Denial or Violation of the
Motion in Limine
1. Denial of the Motion in Limine
Defendant's recourse following denial of a motion in limine depends
on the type of motion which was sought-absolute or preliminary-
and upon a showing that the trial judge abused his discretion in deny-
ing the order. In the usual preliminary form of the motion in limine,
the court will approve or disapprove a requested restriction at some
pertinent point in the trial. The preliminary motion in limine is there-
fore interlocutory in nature and is not appealable until the final rul-
ing. " When the preliminary motion is denied, counsel should renew
-the motion at trial to assure it becomes part of the record. " 6 This is the
general rule and is probably true in North Carolina. However, in the
case of a motion in limine to suppress evidence before trial on constitu-
tional, statutory, or any other grounds, North Carolina follows the rule
that the order is final and may be appealed by the state or the
defendant. 17
It has been stated that the power to grant or deny a motion in limine
springs from the court's inherent power to determine what evidence is
admissible and what is inadmissible." 8 Only where the court abuses its
113. Rothblatt and Leroy, supra note 104, at 620.
114.. Id.
115. See generally, Davis, Motions in Limine, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 255, 257 (1966).
116. GOLDSTEIN AND LANE, TRIAL TECHNIQUE, § 7.09 at 126 (Supp. 1981).
117. State v. Tate, 300 N.C. 180, 265 S.E.2d 223 (1980). The defendant in Tate, charged with
destroying the state's evidence in a drug case (marijuana), requested and was granted a motion in
limine excluding the evidence because of the unreliability of the drug analysis. He did not allege a
constitutional or statutory violation, as section 15A-974 requires. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-974(a)-
(b) (1978). Moreover, he labelled the motion a motion in limine rather than a motion to suppress.
When the state appealed the ruling, the court of appeals held that because the motion did not
include the specified grounds of § 15A-974, the trial court's ruling was not reviewable under the
provisions of § 15A-979. State v. Tate, 44 N.L. App. 567, 261 S.E.2d 506 (1980). The Supreme
Court of North Carolina disagreed. It stated that the motion in limine referred only to the point
in the trial when the motion was offered. The court stated that the clear implication of North
Carolina's suppression article was that a motion to suppress based on constitutional or statutory
violations should be made prior to trial. If a defendant elects to make a motion in limine to
suppress evidence for any other reason before trial, either the state or the defendant may appeal
the ruling under § 15A-979. 300 N.C. at 182, 265 S.E.2d at 225.
118. Davis, supra note 115, at 257.
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discretion will there be grounds for reversal. Courts have been almost
unanimous in approving the trial court's determination." 9 In recent
criminal cases, North Carolina courts have upheld the denial of a de-
fendant's motion in limine for the following reasons:
1. The highly prejudicial evidence was relevant in light of the sor-
did nature of the case;
1 20
2. The trial judge could not determine the relevance of the claimed
prejudicial information when the pretrial motion was made; 1
3. The claimed prejudicial information was necessary to establish a
common scheme and to corroborate the prosecutrix' testimony; 22 and
4. The trial court, on its own motion, excluded the prejudicial mat-
ter challenged in the motion in limine.
123
The fourth example, State v. Smith, 24 demonstrates that a motion in
limine can be advantageous even where it is denied. In Smith, the de-
fendant was charged with the murder and robbery of a Fayetteville
book store operator. The murder weapon was found near Smithfield
and the defendant was also charged in a robbery there. The trial court
denied defense counsel's motion in limine requesting that the court re-
strict any mention of the Smithfield robbery. After the state began to
question the witness about the discovery of the murder weapon, the
trial court, in the absence of the jury, cautioned the prosecution that he
would declare a mistrial if any mention were made of an unrelated
offense. The North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the trial tran-
script and found as fact that no evidence of the Smithfield robbery was
presented to the jury. 25 It is apparent from the action taken by the
119. But see Gasaway v. State, 249 Ind. 241, 231 N.E.2d 513 (1967); Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 311
(1975).
120. State v. Turgeon, 44 N.C. App. 547, 261 S.E.2d 501 (1980). Defendant's motion in limine
to suppress evidence of a plastic bag filled with pubic hair and sexually explicit photographs was
denied prior to his trial for first degree rape of a female under twelve. The court found the materi-
als were probative of intent. Where sordid and vile acts are alleged the evidence cannot help but
have a sordid and vile taint. Id. at 550, 261 S.E.2d at 503.
121. State v. Ruof, 296 N.C. 623, 252 S.E.2d 720 (1979). Defendant's motion in limine to
exclude evidence of his membership in a motorcycle gang known as the "Outlaws" was denied
prior to his trial for murder. Id. at 628, 252 S.E.2d at 724.
122. State v. Taylor, 301 N.C. 164, 270 S.E.2d 409 (1980). Defendant kidnapped and raped
the prosecutrix, all the while threatening her with his similar acts of depravity. Although the trial
court did restrict the state's cross-examination to defendant's prior convictions, it denied other
parts of his motion in limine seeking to prohibit all mention of defendant's other crimes. On
review, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that evidence of the crimes was not erroneously
admitted as it demonstrated the manner of the victim's subjugation and a common scheme of
events in the kidnapping and also as it corroborated the prosecutrix's testimony. Id. at 170, 270
S.E.2d at 413.
123. See State v. Smith, 301 N..C. 695, 272 S.E.2d 852 (1981).
124. Id.
125. Id at 698, 272 S.E.2d at 855.
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trial court that defense counsel's motion probably served to increase the
court's awareness of the potential prejudice of the evidence.
2. Violation of an Order in Limine
In other jurisdictions, the presence or absence of instructions di-
recting the jury not to consider the prejudicial evidence and defense
counsel's failure to request such instructions appear to be determinative
factors.12 6 In other words, where prejudicial evidence is admitted
before the court's ruling on its admissibility, other courts have held that
it is not error in situations where the trial court gave limiting instruc-
tions to the 2jury or where defense counsel failed to request such
instructions. I
The following strategy has been suggested. When an order in limine
is violated at trial, or when the subject matter of a pretrial or trial mo-
tion in limine is permitted to come before the jury, defense counsel
should object to the question, stating the reasons set forth in the motion
in limine, and move for mistrial. If the court fails to grant the motion
for mistrial, counsel should not request a limiting instruction, but he
should state for the record that he is not conceding the correctness of
the court's rulings on the previous two motions. Counsel should also
state that a limiting instruction will not cure the prejudice which the
defendant has suffered.1
2 8
Recent North Carolina cases do not unequivocally support the
soundness of this strategy. 129 In State v. MeCormack,"'3  a defendant,
on trial for breaking and entering and larceny, moved for voluntary
discovery of all statements of co-defendants, books, or other tangible
evidence that the state intended to offer at trial. When defense counsel
eceived no response to the discovery motion, the trial court granted a
motion in limine prohibiting reference to any materials requested in
defendant's motion for discovery without first determining the admissi-
bility of such materials outside the presence of the jury. At trial, before
a determination of its admissibility, the court allowed the state to offer
a statement of an accomplice describing the burglary charged. Objec-
tion to the witness' testimony was overruled, and defense counsel did
not request a limiting instruction. The court of appeals recognized the
error in admitting the statement before the jury, but found the error
was harmless.'
3'
126. Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 311 (1975).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 318.
129. See State v. Setzer, 42 N.C. App. 98, 256 S.E.2d 485 (1979); State v. McCormick, 36 N.C.
App. 521, 244 S.E.2d 433 (1978).
130. 36 N.C. App. 521, 244 S.E.2d 433.
131. Id. at 524, 244 S.E.2d at 435. In the opinion, the court reasoned that the error was ren-
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In State v. Seizer, 32 the court again found a violation of an order in
limine to be harmless error, but for different reasons. Defendant, a re-
puted "firebug," faced charges of arson and second degree murder.
The trial court granted a motion in limine, limiting the state or its wit-
nesses from commenting on any other fires occuring in the vicinity of
the defendant's home. At trial, without prior approval, the district at-
torney began questioning the defendant's mother concerning fires at
the defendant's former place of residence. Before she could answer, the
trial court sustained defense counsel's objections and motion to strike.
The court then instructed the jury not to consider the question for any
purpose. Outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge denied de-
fense counsel's motion for mistrial, but admonished the state that he
would call a mistrial on his own motion if any more questions of that
kind were asked. The court of appeals held that because defendant's
mother did not answer the state's question, the motion to strike was
allowed, and the court instructed the jury not to consider the evidence,
and since other evidence could have supported the jury's verdict, the
violation of the order in limine was not reversible error.1
33
In the final analysis, the law in North Carolina, both as to impeach-
ment of the defendant-witness and as to the use of the motion in limine
as a measure of protection, is heavily stacked against the defendant.
This has much to do with both the confusion the case law and the lack
of uniform attacks by defense counsel upon the practices utilized by
prosecutors when cross-examining defendants. Counsel should be inti-
mately acquainted with the small body of case law concerning im-
proper prosecutorial cross-examination techniques, and he should be
prepared to make instantaneous objections to those practices that too
often go unchallenged at present. In addition to momentarily confus-
ing and unbalancing the prosecutor, such objections will generate, for
appellate purposes, more clearly defined issues. North Carolina courts
will then be faced with the task of drawing the line between what can
and cannot be used by the prosecution when cross-examining the de-
fendant-witness.
dered harmless by the court's late limiting instruction that the jurors consider the testimony of a
second witness as it might bear on the credibility of the accomplice. It is difficult to see how this
abated the prejudice defendant suffered when the statement was read. Id. at 524, 244 S.E.2d at
435.
132. 42 N.C. App. 98, 256 S.E.2d 485 (1979).
133. Id. at 106-07, 256 S.E.2d at 490-91.
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